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The carcinogenicity (cancer-inducing potential) of pharmaceuticals is an important risk factor for health
when considering whether thousands of patients on drug trials or millions/billions of consumers in the
marketplace should be exposed to a new drug. Drawing on ﬁeldwork involving over 50 interviews and
documentary research spanning 2002e2010 in Europe and the US, and on regulatory capture theory, this
article investigates how the techno-regulatory standards for carcinogenicity testing of pharmaceuticals
have altered since 1998. It focuses on the replacement of long-term carcinogenicity tests in rodents
(especially mice) with shorter-term tests involving genetically-engineered mice (GEM). Based on
evidence regarding ﬁnancial/organizational control, methodological design, and interpretation of the
validation and application of these new GEM tests, it is argued that regulatory agencies permitted the
drug industry to shape such validation and application in ways that prioritized commercial interests over
the need to protect public health. Boundary-work enabling industry scientists to deﬁne some standards
of public-health policy facilitated such capture. However, as the scientiﬁc credibility of GEM tests as tools
to protect public health by screening out carcinogens became inescapably problematic, a regulatory
resurgence, impelled by reputational concerns, exercised more control over industry’s construction and
use of the tests, The extensive problems with GEM tests as public-health protective regulatory science
raises the spectre that alterations to pharmaceutical carcinogenicity-testing standards since the 1990s
may have been boundary-work in which the political project of decreasing the chance that companies’
products are deﬁned as carcinogenic has masqueraded as techno-science.
 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license. Introduction assess pharmaceuticals’ carcinogenic risks because such risksMost social scientists researching pharmaceuticals have devoted
attention to clinical trials and post-marketing experiences of
medicines, which involve patients/users directly (Abraham & Davis,
2010; Abraham & Sheppard, 1999; Daemmrich, 2004; Epstein,
1996; Fisher, 2009; Healy, 2004; Hedgecoe, 2004; Light, 2010;
Pearce, 2007; Petryna, 2009). By contrast, we focus on carcino-
genic risk assessment of pharmaceuticals, a branch of animal/
cellular toxicology apparently removed from people’s use of
medicines, but nevertheless relevant to public health (Tomatis &
Huff, 2001). Human exposure to pharmaceuticals can cause
cancer, so modern societies have assessed the carcinogenicity of
new drugs since the 1960s (Marselos & Vainio, 1991; World
Health Organization, 1969). Neither clinical trials nor post-
marketing monitoring systems of people’s medicine-use canJ. Abraham), R.S.Ballinger@
ess under CC BY license. typically accelerate over the lifespan e 70e90 years for humans e
too long for clinical trials, and too late to prevent cancers even if
detected by post-marketing monitoring (Schou, 1992, p. 210). Thus,
there is considerable need to investigate carcinogenic toxicology
beyond clinical trials and patients’ medicine-taking.
Previous social science research on chemical and pharmaceu-
tical risk assessment has examined how techno-scientiﬁc standards
are applied to particular products by government regulators, and
then explained those regulatory interpretations by reference to
external socio-political factors (Abraham, 1993, 1998; Brickman,
Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985; Jasanoff, 1990; Van Zwanenberg &
Millstone, 2005). Rather, our focus is on the validation and appli-
cation of new techno-regulatory testing standards, speciﬁcally use
of genetically-engineered mouse (GEM) models in pharmaceutical
carcinogenic risk assessment. Our research takes this social science
ﬁeld into new empirical domains where regulators must make
strategic choices about how much control industry should have
over the development of standards.
Of crucial importance is whether the introduction of new GEM
models provides a higher standard than before of screening out
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represents a standard that might enable more pharmaceutical
carcinogens to reach the marketplace contrary to public health,
though in the commercial interests of industry. For decades, regu-
latory agencies in Europe and the US have beenmandated by law to
protect public health (Doern & Wilks, 1998; Majone, 1996). We
argue that regulatory agencies permitted the drug industry to
shape the validation and use of those new GEM tests as screens for
pharmaceutical carcinogenicity in ways that prioritized commer-
cial interests over the need to protect public health. Consequently,
the limitations of the new tests as public-health protective regu-
latory science were sustained longer than necessary, until a crisis in
their capability to detect carcinogens became extensive, leading to
greater regulatory intervention. We contend that this latest episode
in the history of pharmaceutical carcinogenic risk assessment can
be understood within regulatory capture theory, though to
differing degrees in Europe and the US.
In this context, capture theory refers to regulatory agencies’
‘administrative drift’ towards industry’s commercial interests and
away from their mandated regulatory mission to protect public-
health interests, together with a cyclical regulatory resurgence
when ‘administrative drift’ produces regulatory ‘crises’e classically
a well-publicized drug disaster (Abraham, 1995, 2008; Bernstein,
1955; Carpenter, 2004; Lexchin, 2006). Thus, within capture
theory, ‘administrative drift’ (regulatory capture) is not necessarily
a permanent state. It might be argued, mistakenly, that dereg-
ulatory legislative reforms in the last 15e20 years by EU and US
governments have rendered capture theory irrelevant because they
have mandated their respective drug regulatory bodies, the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency (EMA) and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), to facilitate many industry goals.
Certainly, those reforms emphasized regulators’ role in
promoting health by approving new drugs on to the market, as well
as protection of public health from unsafe drugs. The ofﬁcial
objective of the EMA, formed in 1995, included ‘to promote public
health by providing safe and effective medicines’ (EMA, 1996, p. 9).
Meanwhile, a US Congress, committed to increasing pro-business
regulation, passed the 1997 FDA Modernization Act, which
changed the FDA’s mission statement to include ‘promoting public
health by promptly and efﬁciently reviewing clinical research and
taking appropriate action on themarketing of regulated products in
a timely manner’ (Carpenter, 2010, p. 731). Increased emphases on
faster approvals brought the missions of regulatory agencies closer
to industry’s commercial interests, but they did not extinguish
regulators’ mandate to prioritize health interests. Both EU and US
law continued to require the EMA and the FDA to protect public
health, while faster drug approvals were conditioned on promotion
of health (Abraham & Lewis, 2000; FDA Modernization Act, 1997).
Thus, the possibility and problem of capture remained even during
the deregulatory period of the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, neo-liberal
legislative reforms and capture may have reinforced each other.
An alternative view, often put forward by ofﬁcial representatives
of drug regulatory agencies and the pharmaceutical industry, is that
the introduction, validation, and use of GEM tests was an example
of industry and regulators working and learning together in
a scientiﬁc quest to improve carcinogenic risk assessment. On this
view, the trajectory of regulatory agencies’ action should be
understood as that of a ‘learning regulator’ in the face of unfolding
scientiﬁc developments, rather than in terms of capture theory
(Carpenter, 2004). However, we argue that, in this context, the
‘learning regulator’ representation was part of science-politics
‘boundary-work’, which facilitated regulatory capture of carcino-
genic risk assessment by enabling industry scientists to deﬁne
commercial concerns as matters of techno-scientiﬁc progress, and
to shape some standards of public-health policy according theirinstitutional priorities (Jasanoff, 1990). Subsequently, the conse-
quent industrial science struggled to meet the task of public
interest regulation, so such boundary-work became less feasible as
the worrying implications for public health of GEM tests’ use in
drug development became more compelling among the wider
scientiﬁc and regulatory communities. Consistent with capture
theory, we suggest that the regulatory resurgence, which followed,
exhibited reduced concern to accommodate industry interests and
was an attempt by regulators to reassert their reputation as
guardians of a regulatory science intended to screen out carcino-
genic dangers to public health, rather than solely a result of
learning more about the science. To examine the interest-politics of
the introduction of GEM tests into drug development, and the
applicability of capture theory therein, we investigated the ﬁnan-
cial/organizational control, methodological design, and interpre-
tation of results, of the GEM tests’ validation process; and
considered the types of GEM tests selected for use by industry, the
issues that attended industry use, and the responses by regulators
and experts to the outcomes of such use.
Background
The idea of incorporating GEM models into pharmaceutical
carcinogenicity-testing standards was established at the Interna-
tional Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) during the
1990s (Abraham & Reed, 2003). Formed in 1990, ICH is an organi-
zation/network consisting of expert scientists representing the
pharmaceutical industry associations and government regulatory
agencies of the EU, US and Japan (Abraham, 2009). According to its
secretariat, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers’ Association (IFPMA), ICH aimed to ‘harmonize’ different
techno-regulatory drug testing requirements across the three
regions to increase efﬁciency in drug development and regulation
by eliminating unnecessary duplication in testing without
compromising drug safety e a claim uncritically accepted by some
scholars (Daemmrich, 2004; pp. 157e160; Vogel, 1998). However,
regarding carcinogenicity testing, ICH evidently sought to reduce,
not ‘harmonize’, standards because by the late 1970s, regulatory
agencies in North America, Western Europe, and Japan already all
had the same standards (Abraham, 1998).
Industry participants and regulators fromEurope and Japan at ICH
aimed to decrease the number of long-term rodent carcinogenicity
tests required before marketing approval from two species (rats and
mice) to just one species, the rat (Abraham & Reed, 2003). Typically,
lasting 18e24months, the long-term rodent tests sought to examine
drugs’ carcinogenic effects over most of the lifespan of the test
animals.Theywere themostexpensiveandtime-consumingaspectof
drug testingnot involvingpatients in trialsorepidemiological studies.
For decades they were central to screening for non-genotoxic phar-
maceutical carcinogens, which may initiate and promote tumour
formation, but do not cause themutations thought to initiate tumour
formation. The long-term studies were particularly important health
screens because non-genotoxic carcinogens are not detected by the
inexpensive battery of quick in vitro mutagenicity tests on micro-
organisms and disembodied human cells used to identify genotoxic
carcinogens that cause cancer primarily by damaging DNA.
Initially at ICH, the pharmaceutical industry and European regu-
lators proposed that the long-term carcinogenicity test with mice
should be jettisoned by claiming that mouse tumour ﬁndings were
not relevant to human risk or regulatory decisions about new drugs
(Emmerson, 1992; Usui, Grifﬁths, & Lumley, 1996; Van Oosterhout
et al., 1997). (1) However, the FDA rejected that claim and the
proposal to conduct carcinogenicity testing in only one rodent
species, arguing that such tests were required in more than one
Table 1
Interview response rates.
UK Other EU US Overall (%)
Pharmaceutical industry 4/8 3/10 8/9 15/27 (56%)
Government regulators 3/5 2/9 4/5 9/19 (47%)
Research scientists 5/10 5/8 6/8 16/26 (62%)
Other interests groups 5/9 4/6 4/6 13/21 (62%)
Overall (%) 17/32
(53%)
14/33
(42%)
22/28
(79%)
53/93 (57%)
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greatest threat to humans (Contrera, Jacobs, & DeGeorge, 1997). The
FDA’s unwillingness to accept carcinogenicity testing in just one
rodent species indicates that it was signiﬁcantly less captured than
EU regulators at ICH. Nonetheless, the FDA agreed to a compromise
with industry and Europe, which involved replacing the long-term
mouse test with new GEM tests lasting just six months, even
though ICH experts acknowledged that the new tests had never been
validated for carcinogenicity screening (DeGeorge,1996;MacDonald,
1998; Mitsumori, 1998). In 1997, ICH approved a new techno-
regulatory standard, which permitted pharmaceutical ﬁrms seeking
marketing approval to conduct only one long-term carcinogenicity
test in rats, provided that it was accompanied by an appropriate
alternative short-term GEM test (Abraham & Reed, 2003). Arguably,
industry had used ICH as a vehicle for partial capture of the FDA.
Here we provide the ﬁrst social scientiﬁc investigation of how
these new GEM tests have subsequently been used by the phar-
maceutical industry and regulators. Abraham and Reed (2003)
analyzed debates about carcinogenic risk assessment together
with the emergence of the idea of GEM tests at ICH. Drawing on
separate research, we report fresh ﬁndings addressing the period
after 1998, involving the activities of the International Life Sciences
Institute (ILSI) and the Alternative to Carcinogenicity Testing (ACT)
programme during the 2000s. We surpass Abraham and Reed’s
(2003) analysis of the construction of the GEM testing standard
to examine the socio-political and health signiﬁcance of its vali-
dation and actual use.
Data sources and research methods
The research spanned 2002e2010, including years of ﬁeldwork
in the EU and US. It met ethical requirements of the Wellcome
Trust, who funded it. The research did not require formal institu-
tional ethical approval because it did not involve patients or data
directly relevant to patients. The twomain methods were literature
review and in-depth interviews. For example, PubMed was
searched electronically (1965e2010) using keywords, ‘carcinoge-
nicity testing’, ‘risk assessment’, ‘transgenic animals’, and ‘geneti-
cally altered mouse models’; while Scrip (1998e2010) e the twice-
weekly pharmaceutical trade newsletter ewas searched manually.
Email notiﬁcations of latest developments extended the literature
review to ongoing organizational practices via consultation docu-
ments/drug labels/letters/notices of meetings/newsletters/press
releases. Documents produced by relevant organizations (drug
regulatory agencies, expert advisory committees, pharmaceutical
companies/associations, government research institutes, universi-
ties, cancer organizations, patient associations, professional toxi-
cology societies, and contract services) were also analyzed.
Interviewswere conducted in Europe and the US. The number of
UK interviews was relatively large because the EMA is London-
based, the UK has one of the largest pharmaceutical industries in
Europe, and the research-team was UK-based. In addition to
geographical location, interviewees were selected on primary
criteria as ‘informants’ and on secondary criteria as ‘respondents’.
Primary criteria referred to knowledge/expertise derived from
involvement in ICH and/or subsequent validation/use of the new
testing regime and/or authorship of publications about carcinoge-
nicity testing. Secondary criteria related to institutional afﬁliation,
such as ‘pharmaceutical industry’; ‘government regulators’, ‘expert
research scientists’ working in universities/government institutes,
and ‘other interest groups’, such as patient/consumer organiza-
tions. Interviewees with multiple afﬁliations were allocated
a ‘primacy’ categorization most relevant to our study.
Ninety-three interview requests yielded 53 interviews (57%
response rate), 22 received no reply, and 18 were declined. Table 1shows the response rates per region, by primacy categorization of
interviewees. Informed consent was gained by providing inter-
viewees with an outline of the study, the issues to be covered in the
interview, and the likely use of both. Lasting 1e2 h, interviews were
semi-structured to allow impromptu follow-up inquiries, as well as
pre-planned core questions, which formed the interview protocol,
including topics such as ‘interviewee biography’, ‘animal lifespan
studies’, ‘ICH’, ‘GEM tests’, ‘ILSI’, and ‘GEM tests’ evaluation-in-use. All
were tape-recorded and transcribed, except for three when contem-
poraneous ﬁeld-notes were employed. Data were analyzed inde-
pendently by the authors with assistance of a coding frame and Atlas
computer software, designed forqualitative datamanagement. Codes
included ‘ACT organization’, ‘ACT study and outcomes’, ‘GEM use’,
‘GEM evaluation’, ‘regulatoryeindustry interaction’, and ‘validation’.
Regulatory retreat and industrial capture of validation
The new short-term carcinogenicity tests involved mice, which
were genetically-manipulated by either introduction of genes
associated with human cancer (known as oncogenes), or removal
(‘knocking out’) of genes thought to suppress tumour development,
known as tumour-suppressor genes (Tennant, 1996). Scientists’
understanding of mechanistic routes of human carcinogenesis
informed the types of genetic manipulation involved (2, see
Interview Notes box). The techno-scientiﬁc hypothesis underpin-
ning the GEM tests was that tumour ‘initiation’ was built into
genetically-engineered mice enabling carcinogenic effects to be
detected much sooner than in ‘normal’ rodents because only later
stages of carcinogenesis needed to occur during the experimental
period of drug testing. On this hypothesis, a carcinogenic drug
should be detected quickly by GEM tests because ‘initiated’ animals
should develop more cancer tumours more rapidly than ‘normal’
mice (Schou,1992). ICH outlined three main types of GEM tests: the
tgACmodel involving transgenic mice with the oncogene, v-Ha-ras,
introduced; the rasH2 model using transgenic mice with the
oncogene, cHa-ras; and the p53 model involving ‘knock-out’ mice
with the tumour-suppressor gene, p53, removed.
When ICH approved GEM tests into pharmaceutical regulation in
1998, the tests’ capability to accurately identify carcinogens had
never been validated. This drew criticism from regulators and
academic scientists outside ICH, who regarded inclusion of un-
validated tests in regulatory guidance as premature (3) because it
‘lacked appropriate scientiﬁc rigour’ and was ‘bad science’ (4) (UK
Department of Health, 1997, p. 113). Even some ICH experts
acknowledged that validationwasneeded (MacDonald,1998, p. 272).
Consequently, during the early 2000s, validation studies were con-
ducted mainly in the US. (5) In considering whether the validation
process was captured by industry interests we examine evidence
regardinghowtheprocesswas controlled,designed, and interpreted.
Organizational ‘ownership’ and control of expertise
The American, European and Japanese regulatory agencies
pledged publicly that ICH’s harmonization would not compromise
drug safety. In making that pledge, they acknowledged that test
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which regulatory agencies continued to have central responsibility
mandated in law by their legislatures. All the more so regarding
carcinogenicity testing of pharmaceuticals for non-life-threatening
conditions because the health-promoting effects of rapid drug
approval could scarcely outweigh serious risks of cancer. Yet the
regulatory agencies permitted the pharmaceutical industry to
control the process with which the new GEM tests were ‘validated’.
While the pharmaceutical industry has long controlled the routine
testing of individual drug products in long-term rodent studies for
marketing purposes, efforts to validate the predictive value of the
long-term rodent model as a test standard, have frequently involved
government agencies, most notably the US National Cancer Insti-
tute and National Toxicology Programme, and the Europe-based
International Agency for Research on Cancer (Haseman & Huff,
1987; Huff, Jacobson, & Lee Davis, 2008; Marselos & Vainio, 1991).
Hence, the extent of industry control of the ‘validation’ of GEM tests
is a reasonable indicator of capture.
The validation process became known as the ‘Alternative to
Carcinogenicity Testing (ACT)’ programme, whose core funding
derived from thirty companies, mainly in the pharmaceutical
sector, (6) involving 55 laboratories at a cost of US$35 million, (7)
under the auspices of the industry-funded International Life
Sciences Institute (ILSI) in the US (Robinson &MacDonald, 2001, pp.
3e4). While some of ACT’s subcommittees included advisers from
academia, government research, and regulatory agencies, all nine
members of its formal Steering Committee were from industry,
including leading ICH ﬁgures, who had argued for the elimination
of long-term carcinogenicity tests in mice (Cohen, Robinson, &
MacDonald, 2001; Robinson & MacDonald, 2001).
Such industry dominance shaped the expertise drawn upon to
participate in the validation process. The WHO’s International
Agency for Cancer Research (IARC), an independent body, was not
consulted, despite longstanding and internationally-recognized
expertise in carcinogen identiﬁcation and categorization. A
leading industry proponent of ACT justiﬁed IARC’s exclusion on the
grounds that he disagreed with IARC’s categorization of particular
chemicals as human carcinogens, characterizing IARC as ‘political’,
rather than scientiﬁc. (8) Thus, some scientists managing the ACT
validation process were reluctant to involve experts perceived to be
more likely than themselves to interpret pharmaceuticals as posing
carcinogenic risk. The consequence was to justify this industry
agenda by shifting the science-politics boundary so that such
experts would fall outside an ostensibly ‘legitimate techno-scien-
tiﬁc’ agenda.
Shaping of methodology
Industry’s primary concern informing the methodological
design was that GEM tests might produce results propelling
scientists to designate even more pharmaceuticals as presenting
carcinogenic risk than the long-term mouse studies had done. (9)
That scenario could have posed serious commercial drawbacks
offsetting any gains derived from the GEM tests’ lower costs and
shorter duration. According to scientists across the sector, ‘the ILSI
[ACT] study was an attempt by the industry to convince themselves
that these [GEM] assays were not overly sensitive’, that is, they
would not produce more results that industry scientists believed
were false positives by ‘mis-identifying’ (as industry saw it) non-
carcinogens as carcinogens. (10)
The pharmaceutical industry’s agenda to check that the new
GEM tests did not produce more false positives than the long-term
rodent tests explains why most of the compounds selected for the
validation process were non-carcinogens. (11) Of the 21
compounds selected, only six were human carcinogens (deﬁnedaccording to established genotoxicity tests, human epidemiological
ﬁndings and long-term animal studies), while 15 were non-
carcinogens in humans (Robinson & MacDonald, 2001). Yet when
screening for carcinogens to protect public health, the priority is to
have test systems able to detect human carcinogens, and not miss
them (false negatives), so that regulatory agencies can limit/
prevent human exposure to the drug. However, the ACT pro-
gramme investedmore than twice asmuch effort (15:6) in checking
the validity of GEM tests according to industry’s commercial
interests (not too many false positives regarding non-carcinogens)
relative to the interests of public-health protection (not too many
false negatives regarding human carcinogens). That this selection
reﬂected industry bias in the validation process was conﬁrmed by
a former FDA senior scientist, who noted that regulators would
have selected different compounds if they had managed the
process, but ‘the FDA went along with it [the ACT selection]’ to
accommodate industry (12) e further indication of a capture
trajectory showing that the regulators were aware of the scientif-
ically problematic nature of the validation process, rather than
merely on a learning curve.
Interpretation of results
Some of the 21 compounds in the ACT programme were tested
in more than one GEM model, so the number of tests exceeded 21.
Across the six known human carcinogens, involving 32 tests, GEM
models correctly identiﬁed these carcinogens in only 17 (53 per
cent), produced nine false negatives (28 per cent), and 6 (19 per
cent) equivocal results. Hence, in nearly half the cases, GEM tests
failed to identify human carcinogens e the regulatory capability
needed to screen pharmaceuticals for public-health protection. By
contrast, they correctly identiﬁed 82 per cent of compounds that
were both human non-carcinogens and rodent carcinogens, and
100 per cent of compounds that were non-carcinogens in both
humans and rodents (Eastin et al., 2001; Storer et al., 2001; Usui
et al., 2001; Van Kreijl et al., 2001).
Many in the pharmaceutical industry and government regula-
tory agencies involved with ACT found the results reassuring
(Goodman, 2001, p. 174). (13) Apparently a method of carcinogenic
risk assessment had been found that would lessen workload for
regulators and result in faster and cheaper drug development for
industry with no greater commercial risk than before of denial of
marketing approval by regulators because of positive carcinogen
identiﬁcation, false or otherwise. The validation process implied
that GEM tests could be aligned with industry’s commercial inter-
ests and some institutional interests of regulators. However, as
many toxicologists in the US acknowledged, evidence that GEM
tests offered any scientiﬁc improvement over, or could even
adequately replace, the long-term studies in mice to screen for
potential non-genotoxic human carcinogens in the protection of
public health was, at best, scant, especially given a mere 53 per cent
detection rate (Cohen, 2001, p. 188; Cohen et al., 2001, p. 18; Pettit,
2001). (14) Even the US National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences (NIEHS), where many GEM tests were developed, found
that GEM tests missed signiﬁcantly more known/probable human
carcinogens than the two-rodent-species lifespan studies, though
a GEM test plus a long-term carcinogenicity study in rats fared
better (Pritchard, French, Davis, & Haseman, 2003). Moreover, after
the ACT programme’s completion, the UK expert Committee on
Carcinogenicity (UKCoC) concluded that none of the GEM models
were suitable to replace long-term mouse studies (UKCoC, 2003).
(15) Yet, the EMA and the FDA, accepted ACT’s favourable inter-
pretation of the ‘validation’ results and permitted industry to
continue to control the nature of the GEM tests in use for drug
development. We contend that this reﬂected capture, rather than
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reasons had already emerged to suggest regulatory caution about
GEM tests’ capabilities to protect public health.
Using the mouse models: industrial science eclipses public
health
By 2003, the FDA reported that a quarter of the proposed
mouse carcinogenicity studies it received from companies were
GEM tests instead of a long-term mouse study (MacDonald et al.,
2004). Twenty-four completed GEM tests (p53, tgAC, and rasH2)
were reviewed by the FDA between 1998 and 2003, though only
eight by the EMA (Jacobson-Kram, Sistare, & Jacobs, 2004; Van
der Laan, 2003). About three-ﬁfths of these were p53 and
a ﬁfth were tgAC. Less frequent use of the tgAC test may be
because regulators stipulated that it was suitable to assess only
carcinogenicity of dermal pharmaceutical products (Jacobson-
Kram et al., 2004, p. 51; MacDonald et al., 2004). Use of the
Japanese rasH2 model was sparse in Europe and the US
(MacDonald et al., 2004).
The regulatory agencies’ representation of GEM-tests’ intro-
duction as merely a scientiﬁc quest to improve carcinogenic risk
assessment was consistent with their mandate to protect public
health. However, examination of industry’s preoccupations when
using the tests reveals that that representation is better understood
as boundary-work, which rendered commercial priorities indis-
tinguishable from regulatory science and assisted the continued
industry capture of carcinogenic risk assessment. As we show in the
remainder of this section, in industry hands, the costs of the new
science and its potential to enhance product success drove the
nature and extent of GEM tests’ use, rather than optimal advances
in public-health protection.
Costs and savings
Despite the NIEHS’s ﬁnding that without long-term rat studies,
GEM tests failed to detect a considerable number of human
carcinogens, the Chair of the ACT programme’s Steering Committee,
a senior industry toxicologist, proposed that the ‘core battery’ of
carcinogenicity testing should include in vitro mutagenicity tests
combined with GEM models, but exclude any long-term rodent
studies at all e which he relegated to ‘ancillary studies . not
required unless all other data are inconclusive’ (MacDonald, 2004).
That proposal seemed to encapsulate a widespread industry view
that relying on only one long-term study instead of twowas merely
a stepping-stone towards elimination of all long-term rodent
studies e a direction of travel aided by the shift in ‘conceptual
power’ established by the ICH compromise (Carpenter & Tobbell,
2011).
The stepping-stone was intended to reduce the costs and
duration of drug development. Although GEMs were ten times
more expensive than ‘normal’ experimental mice, the smaller
number of animals requiring fewer feeding, housing, and labour/
pathology costs than the long-term mouse study was estimated to
deliver a 30e50% saving e approximately US$750,000 per drug.
(16) More importantly, time saved by the shorter GEM tests
potentially allowed a new block-buster drug an additional year or
more of post-market patent protection from generic competitors
that could be worth a billion dollars to the manufacturer. (17)
Product security
Neither the small size nor short duration of GEM tests was the
crucial element of commercial interest for pharmaceutical
companies. One industry scientist elaborated that such savings‘may not be nearly as important as getting the type of results you
want, and getting them when you want, to the satisfaction of
regulatory agencies’. (18) Conﬁdence that a carcinogenicity test was
not going to jeopardise marketing approval of their new drugs was
the most important consideration for companies because proﬁts
from marketing had the potential to dwarf the development costs
of testing, especially non-clinical testing. (14) That explains why the
industry invested heavily in a validation process designed to check
that GEM tests would not generate an excessive number of ‘false’
positives.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ emphasis on obtaining favourable
outcomes affected their choice of carcinogenicity test, made care-
fully to avoid ‘false’ positives because ‘you might turn up results
that you needn’t have produced [with a different test]’. (19) As one
senior industry scientist involved with ACT disclosed, pharmaceu-
tical companies feared positive results in GEM tests more than in
long-term mouse studies because their scientists had become
adept at challenging the signiﬁcance of some positive tumour
ﬁndings in long-term mouse tests to human carcinogenic risk:
What do you do with the positive? That’s what really terriﬁes
much of the pharmaceutical industry. If I get a positive ﬁnding in
the two-year [long-term] mouse bioassay, I understand what to
do with it. . If I get a positive result on a p53 mouse e the
emotional response to that by the regulatory community is
much greater. than a positive [long-term] mouse bioassay. In
today’s world, a positive ﬁnding in the livers of mice after two
years [long-term study] is of virtually no regulatory conse-
quence e it’s written off because we’ve taken three decades to
understand it and get comfortable with it. (8)
Thus, avoidance of positive results in GEM tests was particularly
important to the industry because it had not developed sufﬁcient
explanations to attribute GEM tumours to some cause other than
the test drug. It may be noted that the FDA, unlike European
regulators, did not accept that liver tumour ﬁndings from long-
term mouse studies were irrelevant to human carcinogenic risk.
Nonetheless, a positive result in GEM tests was likely to be more
damning for a drug’s prospects than liver tumours in mice over
a long-term study.
Flexibility in test scenarios
Many in industry favoured GEM tests over long-term studies
because of increased ﬂexibility over drug testing. For example,
because a short-term GEM test could be started later in the drug
development process than a long-term rodent study, if early clinical
trials indicated that the drug should be abandoned, then the
company could avoid any in vivo carcinogenicity testing. (18)
Alternatively, GEM tests could be used early in drug development
before clinical trials, as pre-screening for a long-term study, (8) or
used later to alleviate concerns about the adequacy/results of
a long-term study in rats (MacDonald et al., 2004).
Further indication that the EMA was more captured than the
FDA regarding these matters is the ﬁnding that industry scientists
and some EU regulators expressed concern that the FDA might
require GEM tests to be conducted before the later, large-scale
clinical trials, known as phase-three trials. That scenario would
limit a ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility and could delay the drug development
process. (1) Yet, as FDA scientists pointed out, completion of GEM
tests before phase-three clinical trials (sometimes lasting a year or
more) could prevent exposure of many patients to potential
carcinogens (Jacobs & Jacobson-Kram, 2004). (20) Evidently, the
FDA was not completely captured and by 2004 had become more
interventionist about GEM tests. However, many other aspects of
industry use of GEM tests remained unregulated.
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GEM tests as a pre-screening regulatory requirement before
beginning a long-term study in rats because that scenario would
deny ﬁrms ﬂexibility in interpreting results across different carci-
nogenicity tests. (21) Furthermore, such pre-screening would delay
drug development by over six months, with adverse commercial
implications. (7) Consequently, drug ﬁrms’ commercial interests
propelled them to use GEM tests concurrently with a long-term rat
study, which could be terminated after six months if GEM tests
were positive. (12) Concurrent screening generated inferior
knowledge-acquisition that was less likely to maximize public-
health protection because the long-term rat study could not be
designed according to what was learned from the GEM test. (22)
Nonetheless, such practices remained unchallenged by regulators.
Regulatory resurgence and reputational control: the
unravelling of industry science
For 60% of pharmaceuticals subjected to the tgAC test during
their development, and submitted to the FDA, the test produced
positive results, often while long-term rat studies were negative.
Hence, the test could frequently undermine new drug develop-
ment, which may account for its unpopularity with industry. (23)
As tgAC test results derived from the skin, alternative causes of
positive carcinogenicity ﬁndings were put forward, such as tumour
development due to mice’s grooming and wounding, purportedly
making the test ‘too sensitive’ for risk assessment. (24) Conse-
quently, this GEM model became increasingly marginalized in
pharmaceutical development and regulation, not least because
industry rarely selected it for use. (8,11)
With tgAC’s marginalization, the p53 test became of paramount
importanceandby far themostwidelyused indrugdevelopment.Use
of the p53 test drew few complaints from companies. It was rarely
positive, so did not usually threaten the viability of pharmaceutical
products. (17,25) However, if those many negative p53 test results
included false negatives, then that could imply public exposure to
undetected carcinogens. As we show in this section, regulators
responded to that problemwith increased oversightof thedesignand
use of GEM tests in drug development, but only after it had reached
crisisproportions.Giventhe techno-scientiﬁc limitationsofGEMtests
to screen for human carcinogens, even at ‘validation’, such regulatory
intervention might have been expected earlier if the regulatory
agencies were merely on a learning curve about how to improve
carcinogenicity testing in the interests of public health, rather than
engaged in a regulatory resurgence to re-establish their reputation.
Regulators confront dysfunctional industry science
Speciﬁcally, by the mid-2000s, for all ﬁve of the new drug
applications received by the EMA, and in all but one of the 17
received by the FDA, using the p53 test, the result was negative,
which then contributed to an overall drug evaluation alongside
long-term rat studies (MacDonald et al., 2004). Although the one
positive p53 result led to withdrawal of the drug from the market,
evidently the p53 test was almost always used to conﬁrm a nega-
tive, or question, a positive long-term carcinogenicity study in rats.
(26) For example, p53 tests were negative for drugs found to
generate lymphomas, kidney tumours and/or testicular neoplasms
in long-term rat studies (Sistare & Jacobs, 2003). Moreover, most of
the 16 drugs submitted to the FDA with negative p53 results were
found to be positive in the standard battery of in vitro genotoxicity
tests, as well as positive in long-term rat studies. Even the
staunchest supporters of the p53 model in government agencies
and the industry could not render those kinds of negative results as
credible for regulatory decisions. As one expert regulatory advisornoted, actual use of the p53 test suggests that it may be producing
‘lots of false negatives’. (27) Similarly, an FDA regulator remarked:
‘what we’re ﬁnding out now is that very few things are positive in it
[p53] e so now regulators are saying, “it’s not sensitive enough”’.
(17) To maintain an adequate reputation for public-health protec-
tion, regulators began to press an agenda for longer and larger GEM
tests thought less likely to miss carcinogens.Streamlining in reverse e a regulatory science for public health
Regulators’ growing concerns about false negative results with
p53amounted toa scientiﬁc crisis about the test’s validity.Questions
were asked about whether the test-model was too short-term,
involved too few animals or was too mechanism-speciﬁc for regu-
latory screening. (28) While the short-term duration of p53 and
other GEM tests had commercial advantages for pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, it also meant that exposure during chronic ageing was avoi-
ded, possibly overlooking drug carcinogenicity manifest during the
ageingprocess. (12)Hence, increasinglyscientists proposed thatp53
tests should be extended from six to nine months duration in the
hope of improving their detective capability.
Reductions in animal numbers from 50/sex/dose-group in life-
span studies to just 15 in GEM tests was a promising ﬁnancial gain
for industry, though ‘not necessarily an improvement in the
science’. (29) Nevertheless, partly in response to the prevalence of
p53 negatives, from the mid-2000s, the EMA and FDA recom-
mended an increase in the size of GEM tests from 15 to 25 animals/
sex/dose-group to improve the tests’ ‘statistical power’ to register
signiﬁcant carcinogenic effects. (11,18) Such changes, however,
eroded some of the ostensible advantages of GEM tests over long-
term studies, including savings for industry. As relentlessly nega-
tive results from p53 tests became increasingly non-credible for
protecting patients from carcinogens, regulators were no longer
willing to stake their reputation on that industrial science.GEM tests as regulatory science in crisis
Most signiﬁcantly, the problem of extensive false negatives with
p53 tests generated fundamental crises of conﬁdence in the
mechanistically-oriented, GEM model approach to regulatory
screening for pharmaceutical carcinogens. As one industry scientist
succinctly put it:
At most, you’ve got three mechanisms of carcinogenesis that are
represented in these [GEM] models. That’s not the only way
cancer can be produced. (5)
Indeed, in 2000, the US National Cancer Institute listed over
4500 different genes related to cancer. One FDA regulator explained
why this scientiﬁc crisis threatened public health and the viability
of GEM testing for industry:
Few chemicals are carcinogenic by only one mechanism. So if
you tested it [drug] in two or three transgenic models, it could
still be carcinogenic even though it was negative in all of them.
That’s the problem and we do not have enough transgenic
models that are useful and validated to line up against all
potential mechanisms of carcinogenesis, and even if we did,
what good would that be? Because when you have an unknown,
are you going to test them [new drugs] in 20 different transgenic
models? No, . you would stop using transgenic models, and
just go back to the two-year [long-term studies].(2)
The hypothetical scenario of using 20 different GEM tests for
each drug development would also be more costly and time-
consuming than a long-term study. (30)
Interview notes
1. EU-ICH regulator, pre-clinical drug safety assessment. For discussion of
contestations surrounding long-term rodent studies, see Abraham and
Reed (2003).
2. US regulator/director, senior FDA adviser.
3. UK university toxicology professor, industry/regulatory consultant.
4. Senior UK regulator.
5. Scientiﬁc director, Danish pharmaceutical ﬁrm (an ILSI company).
6. Senior FDA representative; National Center for Toxicogenomics (NCT)
representative, NIEHS.
7. Professor of pathology & ILSI-ACT committee member.
8. Executive vice-president, US pharmaceutical company & ILSI-ACT member.
9. NCT representative, NIEHS; Vice-president, US pharmaceutical ﬁrm
(formerly senior FDA scientist); group leader, transgenic carcinogenesis,
Laboratory of Molecular Toxicology, NIEHS & ILSI-ACT.
10. Vice-president, safety assessment, Swiss pharmaceutical company; group
leader, transgenic carcinogenesis, Laboratory of Molecular Toxicology,
NIEHS & ILSI-ACT; government scientist, Netherlands National Institute
of Public Health and Environment (NIPHE); NCT representative, NIEHS.
11. NCT representative, NIEHS.
12. Vice-president, safety assessment, Swiss pharmaceutical company.
13. Vice-president, safety assessment, Swiss pharmaceutical company;
EU-ICH regulator, pre-clinical drug safety assessment.
14. Toxicologist, vice-president, UK pharmaceutical company.
15. Member, UKCoC.
16. Vice-president, drug safety, US pharmaceutical company & ILSI-ACT;
vice-president, safety assessment, Swiss pharmaceutical company;
pathologist at US pharmaceutical ﬁrm; government scientist, Netherlands
NIPHE & ILSI-ACT.
17. FDA-ICH regulator.
18. Pathologist at US pharmaceutical ﬁrm.
19. Consultant toxicologist, UK contract research company involved
in ILSI-ACT.
20. US regulator; Vice-president, safety assessment, US pharmaceutical
company.
21. Distinguished industry toxicologist.
22. Chief Scientist, Laboratory of Experimental Pathology, NIEHS.
23. Senior researcher, carcinogenesis, UK chemical company; vice-president,
drug safety, US pharmaceutical ﬁrm & ILSI-ACT; toxicologist, UK
pharmaceutical company.
24. Associate director, chemical carcinogenesis, NIEHS; government
toxicologist/pathologist/geneticist, Netherlands NIPHE.
25. Genetic/cellular toxicologist, US pharmaceutical company & ILSI-ACT.
26. FDA-ICH regulator; vice-president, safety assessment, US pharmaceutical
company.
27. Head of US science advisory committee.
28. Senior researcher, carcinogenesis, UK chemical company; vice-president,
safety assessment, US pharmaceutical company; executive vice-president,
pharmaceutical/safety sciences, US pharmaceutical ﬁrm & ILSI-ACT; vice-
president, pre-clinical safety, US pharmaceutical company & ICH.
29. Vice-president, drug safety, US pharmaceutical company & ILSI-ACT.
30. Associate director, chemical carcinogenesis, NIEHS.
31. German regulator/genetic toxicologist involved with EMEA and ILSI.
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tests led some scientists to conclude that the problem of identifying
non-genotoxic carcinogens relevant to human risk ‘still exists
[because] these [GEM]models have not proved good discriminators
between many non-genotoxic and genotoxic compounds’, (3) and
have not provided ‘more information on mode of action for non-
genotoxic compounds’. (31)
Discussion and conclusion
Bernstein’s (1955) life-cycle theory of regulatory agencies posits
that, when ﬁrst established in the aftermath of some public
disaster, they exhibit regulatory zeal to protect public (health)
interests, but then become captured by regulated industries
(administrative drift) until a new disaster reinvigorates a regulatory
resurgence, commencing a new cycle. Capture theory’s ﬁrst phase
is irrelevant here because the FDA long pre-dated carcinogenicity-
testing standards, while the EMA resulted from Europeanization
politics, rather drug disasters (Abraham & Lewis, 2000; Carpenter,
2010). Nonetheless, we maintain that developments in
carcinogenicity-testing standards since ICH can be understood in
terms of the second and third phases, namely, ‘capture’ and
‘regulatory resurgence’, albeit with some theoretical innovations.
Those innovations involve less absolute and dramatic interpre-
tations of ‘capture’ and ‘regulatory resurgence’ than Bernstein. We
allow for relativity of capture, ‘boundary-work’ as a facilitator of
capture, and ‘reputation’ more broadly deﬁned as a generator of
regulatory resurgence (Carpenter, 2010; Jasanoff, 1990). For
instance, in arguing that the FDA was captured by industry inter-
ests, we do not claim that it was completely so, while also ﬁnding
that it was less captured than the EMA regarding carcinogenic risk
assessment. Going beyond classical capture theory, we appreciate
the importance of boundary-work in representing administrative
drift towards industry interests as pursuit of techno-scientiﬁc
progress. Moreover, we found that regulatory resurgence was
manifest without a new public disaster because regulatory agencies
acted to protect their reputations of scientiﬁc credibility among the
wider expert community when faced with a crisis in regulatory
science posing risks to the public.
In these terms, capture theory extends to processes concerned
with legitimation of risk assessment standards supposed to protect
public health when regulatory agencies cede organizational control
of those processes to industry. The evidence suggests that capture
theory provides a more plausible social scientiﬁc understanding of
the development of carcinogenicity-testing standards than a theory
of regulatory learning from techno-scientiﬁc progress. Speciﬁcally,
the GEM-tests’ validation process did not seek maximum scientiﬁc
knowledge about their validity, but instead was an exercise,
accommodated by regulators, in establishing whether the tests
were consistent with industry interests by prioritizing avoidance of
false positives. Similarly, our ﬁndings suggest that industry framing
of GEM-tests’ use around commercial preoccupations with costs
and maximization of product success was tolerated by regulators
longer than would be expected if regulatory agencies had been
merely on a scientiﬁc learning curve to improve public-health
protective carcinogenic risk assessment.
That resulted in use of GEM tests that rarely recorded positive
results for carcinogenicity, together with a marginalization of those
more likely to be positive, because of ﬁrms’ strategies to avoid
commercially damaging positive results. It also reinforced
a tendency, already present in the validation process, not to sufﬁ-
ciently interrogate false negativity of GEM tests because negative
carcinogenicity results helped drugs advance to the market.
Consequently, we suggest that regulators’ acceptance of extensive
industrial control of the validation and use of GEM tests obfuscatedthe impending crisis with the p53 test as an adequate tool of
carcinogenic risk assessment to protect public health. The fact that
stronger regulatory oversight did not emerge until there was
a crisis further implies regulatory resurgence to reassert reputation
following capture, rather than a progressive scientiﬁc learning
curve.
Finally, given experts’ and regulators’ acknowledgement of GEM
tests’ limitations in screening for carcinogens, our research raises
questions about whether ICH’s pledge that regulations permitting
just one lifespan carcinogenicity study in rats plus a GEM test,
instead of two-rodent-species lifespan carcinogenicity tests, would
not compromise drug safety may not have been upheld. Indeed, our
ﬁndings raise the spectre that changes to pharmaceutical carcino-
genicity-testing standards and subsequent ‘validation’ may have
been a massive exercise of boundary-work in which the politico-
economic project of decreasing the chance that companies’ prod-
ucts are deﬁned as carcinogenic has masqueraded as a purely
‘techno-scientiﬁc’ process.
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